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RECENT DECISIONS.
BILLS AND NOTES-TRAVELLERS' CHECKS-NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
TO BE COUNTERSIGNED BY PAYEE-FORGERY OF PAYEE'S SIGNATURE-LIABILITY OF DRAWER.

A payee of travellers' checks, which upon issuance are required
tc be signed by the payee and are to be paid by the correspondents
of the drawer, the issuing bank, when countersigned with the signature of the payee, lost his travelling checks; the checks were subsequently paid by the drawer's correspondent on the forged signature of the payee. HELD that the drawer was liable to the payee
for the value of the checks, the uncountersigned traveller's check
being regarded as similar to an unindorsed check payable to the
order of a designated payee. (Sullivan v. Knauth, i6I A. D. 148.)
Banks are bound 'to know the signatures of their customers.
and they pay checks purporting to be drawn by them at their peril.
(Frank v. The Chemical Bank, 84 N. Y. 209.) Banks are not
bound to know the handwriting or the genuineness of the body of
the checks drawn upon them and paid by them (N. B. of C. in
N. Y., v. N. B. Bk. A. of N. Y.. 55 N.Y. 211.)
Banks are bound at their risk to know the genuineness of the
signature of the payee indorsed on a check payable to a designated
payee, (Morgan v. Bank of State of N. Y.. I I N. Y. 404.) Banks
issuing traveller's checks, which are first signed by the payee and
paid by the issuing bank's correspondents, when countersigned with
the payee's signature are bound at their risk to know the genuine-
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ness of the countersigned signature. Samberg v. American Erpress Co., 136 Mich. 639, has been adopted in New York and seemingly is the only case upon the subject.

CORPORATIONs-RIGHIT OF CORPORATIONS

TO PURCHASE SIIARES

OWN STOCK. A stock corporation in New York has express -legislative authorization to repurchase shares of its own
stock in but one instance i. e., where the stock is accepted "in complete or partial settlement of a debt owing to the corporation which
by the board of directors shall be deemed to be bad or doubtful."
(Stock Corp. Law, Sec. 28.) The transaction has implied statutory prohibition in but one instance, i. e., where the purchase price
i- paid out of other than the surplus funds of the, company. In such
a case, the directors are guilty of a misdemeanor. (Penal Law, Sec.
664.) Without further legislation but by a long line of decisions, it
has become the well settled law of the State that a corporation acting in good faith, without intent to defraud either creditors or
minority stockholders and employing only its surplus funds, has'
the undisputed right to purchase shares of its own stock, hold
them unextinguished, and reissue them. (City Bank of Columbus
v. Bruce, 17 N. Y. 507; Vail v. Hamilton, 85 N. Y. 453; Booth V.
Dodge, 6o A. D. 27; Strodl v. Farish-Stafford Co., 145 App. Div.
4o6 Joseph v. Raff, 82 App. Div. 47; in re Fechheimer Fishel Co.,
2 Fed. 357; Moses v. Soule, 63 Misc. 203; Cullen v. Friendland,
OF ITS

152 App. Div. 124; Richards v. Wiener Co.. 145 App, Div. 353;
2o7 N. Y. 59.)

There is no common law principle which prohibits such a transaction nor is it void as against public policy (City Bank of Colunbus v. Bruce, 17 N. Y. 507). Nor does the transaction operate to
diminish the capital stock of the corporation as a necessary consequence. Whether such an effect is wrought, becomes a question
purely of intention (City Bank v. Bruce, supra; Vail v. Hamilton.
supra; Booth v. Dodge. supra). Where the corporation has repurchased its stock with an intent and agreement to make an immediate resale, the courts have uniformly upheld the transaction.
(Joseph v. RafT, supra; Moses v. Soule, supra.) Where a corporation had contracted to sell certain of its patent rights in exchange
for shares of its own stock, the court held the contract void in the
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absence of evidence either of a surplus equal to the value of the
rights transferred or of an agreement of resale. (Stevens v. Olus
Mfg. Co., 72 Misc. 508.)
By reason of Section 664 of the Penal
Law, it is evident that in every contract in which a corporation
agrees to repurchase some of its own shares, the law reads in a
proviso that when the time of payment arrives, the company shall
have a surplus out of which such payment may lawfully be made.
This is a risk which any stockholder takes upon contracting to
sell shares to the corporation which issued them (Richards v.
Wiener, supra; in re Fechheimer-Fishel Co., supra). Both sound
and well reasoned decisions. Such a contract, therefore, is presumptively legal at the time of its making, subject to certain limitations upon its enforceability. In a suit by the vendor for breach
of the contract, the burden is on the corporation to show that when
the payment was to have been made by it, it had no surplus and that
hence the consummation of the contract had become illegal. (Richards v. Wiener, supra.) But in the Federal courts, the burden has
been placed upon the vendor to the corporation to show that there
was a surplus. (Harmon v. Taylor-Rice Engineering Co., 84 Fed.
392.)

FIXTURES--GAS

RANGES-TITLE ON FORECLOSURE.

Plaintiff installed one hundred gas ranges in an apartment

house by means of the usual service gaspipe and a stovepipe flue.
The gaspipe could be severed by unscrewing a coupling and the
flue by lifting it out of the opening made for it. The contract
tinder which they were installed had all the essentials of a contract
for a conditional sale. The contract was not filed however as is
necessary undbr the conditional sales statutes.

The court there-

fore confined itself to the question whether the defendant as a
bona fide purchaser at a foreclosure sale of the apartment house
acquired any title to the ranges. HELD that such art attachment
of the ranges was not sufficient to cause them to lose their char-

acteristics as personal property. (Central Union Gas Co. v. BrownN. Y. 1o; io3 N. E. 822.)

iMg, 21o

Chairs which are made to conform to plan of a Theatre and
fastened to the floor and used only to seat the audience, are fixtures
attached to the realty. (Gould z,. Springer, 206 N. Y. 64 ; 99 N. F.
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149.) Gaspipes running through the walls and under the floors are
permanent parts of a building, but mirrors supported by hooks and
screws driven into the walls and capable of being detached without
injuring the walls remain chattels. (McKeagc v. Hanover Fire
Insurance Co., 81 N. Y.. 38.) 'Machinery which could be removed
without injuring the real property, but not without materially impairing the efficiency of the plant becomes part of the realty.
(Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Fred W. Wolf Co., x14 Tenn. 255;
io8 Am. St. Rep. 9o3; 86 S. W. 310.) If the owner of mortgaged
lands agrees that a house to be built shall remain the property of
the builder until paid for, it is valid as against the mortgagee, for it
is no impairment of his security. (Roberts v. Caple, 8 Ala. App.
444; 62 So. 343.) The rule as to fixtures is laid down in Teaff v.
Hewitt, i McCook's Ohio 51I, that the three requisites are First.
Actual annexation to the realty or something appurtenant thereto.
Second. Application to the use or purpose to which this part of
the realty with which it is connected is appropriated. Third. The
intention of the party making the annexation to make a permanent
accession to the freehold. This has been followed in Potter v.
Gronzwell, 40 N. Y. 287; but in McRae v. Central National Bank
of Troy, 66 N. Y. 489, the Court while reiterating the rule above
stated says that, if the property has a determinate legal character.
the manner in which the parties treat it would not change that character and the intention of the parties is only material when the
character of the property is not fixed. It is readily seen therefore
that the question in a particular case is a difficult one.

MARRIAGE-ANNULMENT-FRAUD.

Defendant had been ad-

vised by physician that he was suffering from tuberculosis, upon
inquiry made by plaintiff, defendant represented to her that the symptoms he displayed were manifestations of a cold. A few days after
their marriage plaintiff discovered the misrepresentation and at
once ceased cohabitation. In an action for annulment, HELD that
this was "a misrepresentation of a fact of sufficient weight for the
court of competent jurisdiction if either party thereto consents to
void." (Sobal v. Sobal, N. Y. Law Journal, Dec. 7, 1914-)
A marriage is void from the time its nullity is declared by a
court, from the standpoint of public policy, to declare the contract
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such marriage by reason of force, duress, or fraud. Dona. Rel. Law,
§7; Code Civil Pro. §1743.) This, because of the fact that marriage, so far as its validity in law is concerned, continues to be a
civil contract, to which the consent of parties capable in law of
making a contract is essential. (Dom, Rel. Law. §io.) The
statute, however, declares it a civil contract to distinguish it from a
religious sacrament and to make the element of consent necessary
to its legal validity. (Wade v. Kalbfleisch, 58 N. Y. 282.) Marriage is, however, "more than a mere contract." It is a "status
initiated by contract." (Moot v. Moot, 37 Hun. 288.) "It partakes more of the character of an institution regulated and controlled by public authority upon principles of public policy for the
benefit of the community." (Wade v. Kalbfleisch, supra.) Martiage has been held not to be a contract within the meaning of Art.
I, Sec. Io,of the U. S. Const., prohibiting the impairment of con-"
tract obligations by legislation. (Maywood v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190.)
In ordinary civil contracts the general rule is, that any misrepresentation of a material fact going to the essence of the contract is
fraud sufficient to vitiate the consent of the party defrauded. Does
the same rule apply to marriage contracts? It -does, if we bear in
mind the essence of the marriage contract. "Companionship, with
its reciprocal duties, is the basis of marriage." (Keys v. Keys. 6
Misc. 355.) -Consequently, any misrepresentation as to the existence of a fact which would deprive either party of that companionship and consortium which is so essential to the preservation of the
marital relation, will be sufficient to warrant an annulment, if cohabitation does not follow the discovery of the fraud and reasonable prudence could not have discovered it. Misrepresentations as
to general health, fortune, position, previous conduct and such
qualities, do not go to the fundamental elements of the marriage
relation. (Gunibiner v. Gujnbiner, 72 Misc.. 211.) It has beel held
that previous lapses from virtue are not grounds for an annulment,
since the duties of consortium may still be discharged. (Doinschke
z. Doinschkc, 138 A. D. 454.)
.
In Di Lorenzo z. Di Lorenzo, 71 A. D. 5o9 The court sanctioned the rule laid down in Fisk v. Fisk, 6 A. D. 432 and Wendel
v. Wendel, 3o A. D. 452: "If, when the relation is entered into the
party is competent to make the contract, is mentally competent to
do the duties which the contract involves and physically able to
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meet its obligations, nothing more can be required." (See Kujek
v. Goldman, xio N. Y. 176; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen (Mass.)
605.) On appeal (174 N. Y. 472) the court of appeals held that
"there is no valid reason for excepting the marriage contract from
the general rule"-i. e., of fraud, as above stated. In this we think
the court erred. In Svenson v. Svenson, 78 A. D. 536; the court
recognizes the general rule that "ill health although concealed or
misrepresented will not itself justify an annulment." Yet the rule
has no application to "a disease which involves contagion in the
marital relation."- (On appeal, 178 N. Y. 54.)
This reasoning is followed in the principal case. The court
took judicial notice of the fact that tuberculosis is such a disease
that "through the close tie of the marital relation grave and disastrous results from infection may be caused.to the other party and
possible evil consequences to the offspring of such a marriage.'
It is imperative that this doctrine be not extended too far. The
facts of the principal case are apparently strong. There was art
actual misrepresentation to an inquiry. Whether the nature of his
disease imposed a positive duty upon him to make it known, is not
in issue. (Am. & F-ng. Encyc. 14, p. 69-71.) A physician testified
that defendant is incurable. The danger of annulling a marriage
upon a physician's opinion is very obvious. Cohabitation lasted
for a few days and ceased immediately upon discovery of the fraud.
The court does not go into the question whether reasonable prudence could have discovered the nature of the disease.
The dangers of collusion are great. There was no defense
offered in the principal case. There is, therefore, little likelihood of
an appeal; the decision, though in its nature exparte, will serve as
a precedent.

BOOK REVIEWS.
BRAD1BURY' PLEADING AND PRAcTICE REPORTS, VOLUME 3,
edited by Harry B. Bradbury (The Banks Law Publishing Co.).
Reviewers, we think, may be separated into two classes. The
attitude of one class is typified by that of William Style, who, as
long ago as 1658, wrote the "The Epistle Dedicatory," which is prefixed to his reports, that "the Press hath been verv fertile in this
our Age, and hath brought forth many, if not too many births of
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this nature." The other class is imbued with the spirit of that
great master of the intricate art of pleading, Baron Parke, who,
as Serjeant Ballantyne informs us in his recollections, sacrificed
promptness at dinner on the altar of a fine point of demurrer. As
for us, we trust we are not so oblivious to the toil incident to the
preparation of a book for the legal profession as to receive it ungraciously, after the manner, whether real or affected, of reviewers
of the former class.
Mr. Bradbury's latest addition to his series of reports is one to
delight the heart and mind of a Baron Parke. It is filled to-overflowing, like " a gift-ship to Belgium," with decisions which adjudge points in pleading and practice that are of great interest and
extreme nicety. The usefulness of the book is enhanced by the addition (e. g., page 3, etseq., and page I6, etseq.), of exhaustive
notes. The work, of course, is designed purely for members of the
bar. But we venture the opinion that familiarity with its pages will
compensate the law-student for his labor, for, as it was anciently
quaintly said (Co. Litt., §534), "know, my son, that it is one of the
most honorable, laudable, and profitable things in our law, to have
the science of well pleading in actions reals and personals: and
therefore I counsaile thee especially to imploy thy courage and care
to learn this."
We cannot but commend an undertaking such as this, that will
put in enduring form many of the short decisions now preserved in
The New York Law Journal. which illuminate the path to judgment. The utility of printing charges of trial judges is open to
doubt. As a rule. they are extemporaneous. and lack. however accomplished the deliverer, that acute analysis which is the fruit of
discriminating research and long meditation. On the other hand,
we heartily approve of the idea of following an opinion with the
peladings. orders and other forms, discussed by the court or used
by counsel.
If Mr. Bradburv has erred in the discharge of his editorial
duties, his failings mav be said to be ne,,ative rather than positive.
Perhaps we exwect too much of him If so. his is the fault, and
his admirable "Rule of Pleading" the proximate cause thereof.
Apropos of Cafie Mav Glass Co. v. Jetter Bre-wina Cn.. (City
Ct.. 19T2). at page 34. which held that a denial of knowledge or
information. etc.. is frivolous, if interposed by a corporation sued
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ior goods sold and delivered. Apparently, the learned editor has
overlooked Scranton & Lehigh Coal Co. v. Hetkin & Co.,78 Misc.
512, 138 N. Y. Supp. 617 (192), a case where such a denial was
declared to be proper by a court sitting, to use the dictum of MacLean, I., across the "affluent East river, which often divides law
and practice. as did the Mahratta ditch, upon one brink of which the
widow's suttee was commended to and of the pious, while on'the
other it was abhorrent to the law and religion." (Baum v. Elias,
64 Misc. 43, 44, 117 N. Y. Supp. 935 [1907].) While we think the
Cape May case (supra) is impeccably correct, attorneys in the Second Judicial Department, we believe, will continue to treat the
Scranton case (supra) as binding upon them, until it is overruled.
Is Florsheim v. Berlinger (City Ct., 1911), at page 40, sound?
With us, the taint of usury will render a note void, as between
the immediate parties thereto, to say the least. Where then a defendant tacitly admits the making and existence of a note (which
means, to be sure, nothing less than a valid note), by omitting to
deny the plaintiff's allegations thereof, logical consistency would
seem to require that that defendant should be precluded thereby
from thereafter setting forth the defense of usury (see Fleischmant
v. Stern, go N. Y. IIO (1881), and Banzer v. Richter, 68 Misc. 192,
123 N. Y. Supp. 678 [191o]). Is not, therefore, the opposite result attained by the court in the Florsheim case (supra) untenable? It must remain a matter of regret that Mr. Bradbury has
not favored us with his opinion on this question.
The head-note to Speedwell Motor Car Co. v. Boyce (Sup. Ct.,
1913), at page 324, is misleading. It is true the court held that a
motion for bill of particualrs may be based upon an attorney's affidavit. But the head-note is inadequate, because it omits to indicate that the court carefully limited its ruling to the "circumstances of this case." Indeed, the editor's failure to state the facts
robs the case, as reported, of practical value. But in any event the
true rule is, in our opinion, that "the affidavit of an attorney will
only be received when it is shown that he is the only person who
has knowledge of the subject-matter of the litigation, or that it is
not possible to obtain the affidavit of the party, and that the attorney has received from the party full information of the subjectmatter and makes full disclosure of what the information consists" (Mungall v. Bursley, 5P App. Div. 38o, 64 N. Y., Supp. 674
[191o]).

SAUL GORDON.

